







Chapter 3  
Injustice as Injury,  
Forgiveness as Healing 
Raja Bahlul 
 Introduction 
My aim is to argue that forgiveness may be conceived by 
analogy to healing. The analogy is not self-evident. Nor will it 
be of much value unless an appropriate understanding of 
what healing amounts to is provided. For these reasons, we 
shall have to discuss a number of apparently unrelated con-
cepts. The discussion, it is hoped, will reveal how forgiveness 
can be compared to healing in a significant and enlightening 
manner.  
In Section Two I develop analogies between injustice2 and 
injury, on the one hand, and pain and resentment on the 
other, along three distinct, but related dimensions. The first 
is a causal dimension where injury and injustice are viewed 
as causes that normally produce certain effects. The second 
dimension focuses on the effects which injury and injustice 
typically produce: pain in the case of injury, resentment (and 
other negative feelings) in the case of injustice. The third di-
mension has to do with function (role) played by the out-
comes of injustice and injury (namely, resentment and pain) 
                                                                        
 
 
2 I use ‘injustice’ in a broad sense to mean being ‘unjustly treated’ or 
simply ‘being wronged’, with no specification of the kind of wrong 
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in individual and social lives, and the significance of failures 
in this regard.  
In Section Three I present a proposal to view forgiveness of 
injustice by analogy to the healing of injuries. I present three 
reasons for thinking that forgiveness may be profitably com-
pared to healing. The reasons I offer are grounded in, but 
also serve to extend the analogies between injury and injus-
tice on the one hand, and pain and resentment on the other. 
Finally, in Section Four, I discuss some possible objections to 
the present proposal, and respond to them. 
The present proposal presupposes that overcoming re-
sentment is essential to forgiveness. However, I do not claim 
that forgiveness reduces to overcoming resentment. I shall 
discuss these matters in Section One, without pretending to 
offer conclusive arguments. Because my main contribution 
lies elsewhere, I shall take it more or less for granted that for-
giveness is incompatible with harbouring resentment, ha-
tred, anger or indignation, and other negative feelings to-
wards the wrongdoer.  
I. Forgiveness and Emotion 
Reflection on the many discussions of forgiveness reveals 
two major junctures at which emotion becomes relevant to 
forgiveness. The first has to do with the necessary conditions 
for acquiring a standing to f rgive or to be forgiven. This can 
be seen by considering the conditions which need to obtain 
in order that forgiveness may be contemplated or asked for. 
(1) It is typically the case that a culpable act of wrongdoing, 
an injustice, has been committed. The victim is led to make 
moral judgments such as “You have wronged me,” “I have 
endured evil on your hands,” or “You have betrayed me.” (2) 
The wronged party (a) resents, is indignant, angry, or has 
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with the injustice. In addition to (a), perhaps as a conse-
quence, it may be assumed that (b) the wronged party may 
(be motivated to) seek retribution of some kind or other 
against the wrongdoer.3  
It is fairly obvious that conditions (1) and (2) do not pur-
port to say what it is that one does when one forgives. But it 
is not hard to appreciate the extent of emotionality which 
they bring with them. Condition (1) involves making moral 
(value) judgments such as “I have been treated unjustly,” or 
“I have been wronged.” According to some writers, such 
judgments stand in a causal relation to what we subsequent-
ly feel. “When these judgments [of having been wronged] are 
warranted, our first response is… anger and resentment” 
(Hieronymi 2001, 530). Other writers make stronger claims 
about the relation between value judgments and emotions. 
According to traditional Emotivism, which continues to 
thrive and prosper in a variety of guises collectively known as 
“Expressivism,” “moral judgments function to express de-
sires, emotions, or pro/con attitudes” (Joyce 2002, 336-7).4 
This is by no means a universally held view, for many philos-
ophers continue to insist that moral judgments do manage 
to describe something or other, be it Moral Reality, social 
norms, or the workings of the human mind. Nevertheless, as 
one writer says, “virtually no one in the debate over moral 
semantics thinks that moral content just is descriptive con-
                                                                        
 
 
3 It must be kept in mind that only typical cases are being consid-
ered. Cases where one is wronged but does not judge that one has 
been wronged, or where one feels nothing but pleasure at the 
thought of what has been done, are not clearly cases where the 
wronged person can contemplate forgiveness. 
4 According to Jeff Wisdom, “moral judgments express propositional 
attitudes that do not represent or describe the external world” 
(2009, 285). Cf. Simon Blackburn: “an ethic is the propositional re-
flection of the dispositions and attitudes, policies and stances, of 
people” (1984, 310). A particularly good discussion of these matters 
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tent” (Wisdom 2009, 295).5 The idea of an emotional dimen-
sion in moral judgments cannot be lightly dismissed. 
Sub-condition (a) is obviously emotional, because it is 
about how people typically feel when they perceive them-
selves as having been wronged, or unjustly treated. Condi-
tion (b) may not seem to involve reference to emotions. But 
the appearance is deceptive. For emotions motivate actions. 
One who is in a state of fear is inclined to flee; one who is in 
state of anger is inclined to strike; one who is indignant or 
resentful is inclined to punish, retaliate, or take revenge. The 
action-motivating role of emotion is rightly emphasized in 
many contemporary discussions. It has led some to propose 
an account of emotion in terms of “action readiness.”6  
Emotion is thus relevant to forgiveness on account of the 
conditions which must obtain in order for one to be in a posi-
tion to forgive or to be forgiven. But there is another major 
point where emotion enters into the discussion of for-
giveness. On many accounts of what it is for one to forgive, 
emotion is constitutively involved in the very nature of for-
giveness. The view is widely held. According to Murphy, “for-
giveness is a matter of how I feel about you (not how I treat 
you)” (Murphy and Hampton 1988, 21). Of all the current 
                                                                        
 
 
5 See Bernard Williams (1973, 207-229). Williams argues that de-
scription, value, and feeling are irrevocably entangled in “thick” 
moral concepts. 
6 For an explanation of emotion in terms of action readiness see 
Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni (2010, 79-80). Action is not for-
eign to emotion. But this is not behaviorism. It is merely to say that 
the relation between actions and inner states such as anger, re-
sentment or fear, etc., is not an external, contingent relation. Inner 
states are expressed through behaviour, which can on occasion 
constitute conclusive evidence of their reality. Inner states that 
cannot be manifested in behaviour have as much reality as physical 
objects which in principle cannot be observed. For a discussion of 
the relation between inner states and outer actions, see John Mac-
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definitions of forgiveness, says one writer, “…the one that 
enjoys anything close to a kind of consensus is that for-
giveness is the overcoming of resentment” (Newberry 2001, 
233). According to another: 
Most contributors  to the discussion agree… 
that forgiveness entails  the forgoing of  re-
sentment. In fact , al l  too often philosophers  
see forgiveness  primarily  as  a matter  of  ma-
nipulating oneself  out of  this  unpleasant and 
potentially  destructive  emotion. (Hieronymi 
2001, 529-30) 
In opposition to this widely held idea about what for-
giveness entails, some have suggested that forgiveness 
should be defined in terms of how one should be able to act, 
rather than in terms of how one should feel. This is substan-
tially the position which Paul Newberry attributes to Bishop 
Butler, a position that is nicely summed in the words of Mrs. 
Dale, of Anthony Trollope’s The Last Chronicle of Barset: “I 
forgive him as far as humanity can forgive. I would do him no 
injury” (Quoted in Newberry 2001, 233). Leo Zaibert has also 
suggested a view according to which A forgives B when “she 
deliberately refuses to try to offset B’s wrongdoing” (2009, 
387). This makes it possible for one to forgive but to continue 
to resent. 
Zaibert acknowledges that “it sounds odd to say things to 
the tenor of ‘I forgive you’, but I still resent you and blame 
you for what you have done’’ (Ibid., 392). But it is actually 
more than just odd. Continued resentment and ill-feeling 
cannot be so neatly separated and boxed off from action. 
They can, and will, motivate actions ranging from merely 
giving cold shoulder to the wrongdoer, or speaking to him in 
a certain tone of voice, to outright punishment or retaliation. 
The rule is for feelings to be expressed in behaviour, not to 
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But even if we were to reject a close connection between 
feeling and acting, the oddness of the combination of forgiv-
ing and resenting still remains considerable. Try replacing 
the above statement, with its thin, sanitized ‘resent’ and 
‘blame’, by a statement which says “I forgive you, but I still 
hate you on a daily basis for the despicable deed which you 
have done. I forgive you, but, still, the mere thought of you 
makes me sick.” Most of us intuitively feel that such an atti-
tude is incompatible with forgiveness. It strains credulity to 
think that one can truly forgive, but at the same time contin-
ue to seethe with resentment, hate, and anger. If having too 
much of these feelings is incompatible with forgiveness, then 
what forgiveness ideally requires is the overcoming of these 
feelings, either completely, or to a considerable degree at 
least. One cannot forgive and continue to resent. 
If what we have said so far is a fairly accurate description of 
the relevance of emotion to forgiveness, then it will be true to 
say that forgiveness is an emotional affair from beginning to 
end. Resentment, anger, indignation and similar feelings 
play a major role, both in the conditions which make for-
giveness possible to contemplate or ask for, and in what is 
needed to achieve forgiveness, when this is possible at all.  
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the meaning 
and role of resentment at both junctures we shall compare 
resentment to pain. We begin with the situations that give 
rise to pain and resentment in the first place. In the case of 
pain, these are (typically) situations of injury. In the case of 
resentment, these are (again, typically) situations where one 
is subjected to an injustice or wrongdoing.  
II. Two Analogies 
In this section a case will be made for the claim that injustice 
is analogous to injury, whereas resentment is analogous to 
pain. The analogies will be developed along three distinct, 
but related dimensions. The first is a causal dimension where 
injury and injustice are viewed as causes that normally pro-
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may be conceptualized as species of ‘harm’, subject to the 
understanding that this conception subsumes many basic 
kinds of injury and injustice, but perhaps not all.  
The second dimension focuses on the effect or impact 
which injury and injustice have on us: typically, pain in the 
case of injury, and resentment (and other negative feelings 
such as indignation) in the case of injustice. As we shall see 
in due course, it is by no means implausible to conceptualize 
these effects in terms of the more general notion of “motivat-
ing negative attitudes,” provided we keep in mind that no 
understatement is intended by use of the general term ‘nega-
tive attitude’.  
The third dimension has to do with function (or role) which 
pain and resentment play in our lives, and the significance of 
failures in this regard.  
a. Injustice and injury 
Injustice and injury are different notions. This is good news 
for someone seeking to draw an analogy between them. For 
if injury and injustice were one and the same, or very similar 
notions, one could hardly expect to learn much by compar-
ing them.  
There is indeed an ordinary usage which allows one to call 
an act both unjust and injurious in one and the same breath, 
and in a sense which could be either literal or somewhat 
metaphorical. If somebody succeeds in pushing someone off 
a cliff with an intention to kill, such an act could be called 
both unjust (for it is a violation of right) and injurious at the 
same time. So could an act of burning down somebody’s 
property. It can be called unjust and injurious, albeit the lat-
ter in a somewhat extended, but quite important sense.  
These are ordinary, acceptable uses of words. But this is not 
something that we want to start from. We need to build on a 
more solid basis, one that does not help itself to metaphors 
and extended usages. Therefore we choose to begin with the 
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thing which happens when someone stabs someone with a 
knife, or when someone falls and breaks a hand or a leg. In 
other words, we begin with a notion of injury in the sense of 
tissue damage, which includes not only injuries caused by 
“unjust acts” (such as attempted murder), but also injuries 
caused by accidents or natural processes (such as child-
birth).  
What about the other part of the analogy? The notion of in-
justice is considerably more problematic. Fortunately, the 
discussion of the nature and possibility of forgiveness (which 
is our main goal here) does not require a deeper, or more 
exact understanding of injustice than what is readily availa-
ble to commonsense. Thus we should not find much disa-
greement if we were to say that we are talking about a moral 
notion, one that has to do with rights and allotments of 
goods, and violations which may be committed in regard to 
them. Suffice it to say, then, unjust acts are those that violate 
one’s rights, or what one is entitled to. It does not matter to 
us whether the rights in question have to do with distribu-
tion of goods (distributive justice), or retribution (assuming 
that a person who is unjustly treated has a right of redress in 
the form of compensation or infliction of punishment on the 
wrongdoer). 
Unlike the notion of injury, the notion of injustice neces-
sarily involves humans affecting other humans wilfully and 
consciously, directly or indirectly. Unjust acts or arrange-
ments for which human beings are responsible stand to have 
an impact on us which could be physical (such as when 
someone pushes us off a cliff) or more or less intangible 
(such as when someone spreads false rumours about us, or 
when social arrangements leave us with no opportunity to 
take care of ourselves). Thus an injury which is the result of a 
human act of injuring can be a subject of justice and injus-
tice, whereas injuries which we suffer through nature or 
through accident are never a subject of justice and injustice. 
In view of this, one may wonder whether it is possible at all 
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the two notions belong to different domains of discourse. 
But I think this is possible if we can find a feature which is 
common to both unjust and injurious acts or occurrences. 
Both types of occurrence, I want to suggest, change the state 
of the human being (who is at the receiving end) to the 
worse: in both cases (subject to a certain qualification to be 
explained presently) it is appropriate to speak of harm, or 
being harmed.  
The move towards subsuming the notions of injury and in-
justice under the notion of harm, which is what we need to 
get the analogy going, raises at least two objections, one on 
behalf of the notion of injury, the other on behalf of the no-
tion of injustice. Let us begin with the one which is more ob-
vious and, apparently, more effective. It could be said that 
injury cannot always be viewed as a kind of harm, at least 
when we define injury the way we have chosen to define it—
namely, as tissue damage. Medical surgery almost invariably 
requires injury in this sense. So do many kinds of ritual in 
certain cultures. The same could be said of childbirth, natu-
ral or not. All such cases involve tissue damage, and thus 
could be called ‘injurious’ in the present sense of the term. 
But it could hardly be said that medical surgery and child-
birth involve harming the person who undergoes them.  
None of this, I believe, need entail that we have to reject the 
idea that injury is a kind of harm. For it could be insisted that 
the cases mentioned above, and many others like them, do 
involve harm, but one that is either relatively minor, tempo-
rary, well-controlled, or (more importantly) done and en-
dured for the sake of a greater good. In fact, our willingness 
to think of greater goods (and/or greater evils) when we 
submit to such injuries is an admission that leaving the per-
son in a non-injured condition would have been better, had 
other things been equal. But it is precisely because other 
things are not equal, because greater goods are to be had, 
and greater evils are to be avoided, that we are not inclined 
to think of such injuries as cases of harm. But considered in 






s68   Chapter 3 
 
to it, a C-section, an open chest, or an amputation of a limb 
is a case of harm. It is not something that we welcome for its 
own sake. Not only are such cases of tissue damage painful, 
but they also expose the body to all kinds of dangers. This is 
why protective measures (such as sedation and antibiotics) 
are taken when somebody undergoes such kinds of injury for 
the sake of a greater good. 
The case against subsuming injustice under the concept of 
harm faces other kinds of difficulties, more ill-defined and 
rather inconclusive. It may be doubted that the notion of a 
“harm of injustice” (the harm which injustice constitutes) is a 
serviceable notion, given that the notion of harm itself is rel-
ative, both in time and place, with different cultures having 
different ideas about what constitutes harm. 
This is indeed true, but then the same could be said about 
injustice. We have chosen to understand the latter notion in 
the broad sense of “violation of right,” but the notion of 
“right” is as much subject to the relativity of time, place, and 
culture. The question which we have to ask here is whether 
giving an account of forgiveness requires a full account of 
such notions as justice, wrong, and harm. It is not obvious 
that this is the case. We know that a discussion of forgiveness 
will inevitably bring in notions of wrongs, harms, resent-
ment, violence, and damage done to relations between peo-
ple. We also know of paradigmatic examples of wrong, injus-
tice, harm, and injury. Such knowledge goes some way to-
wards justifying belief in cross-cultural meanings, even if 
there is much indeterminacy around the edges. For example, 
it would be perverse to wonder whether an act of imprison-
ing someone against their will, or forcing them to work under 
inhumane conditions, does or does not involve injustice or 
harm. Our pre-theoretical understandings of such notions 
should be sufficient to get the discussion of the nature and 
possibility of forgiveness off the ground.  
Thus we propose to say that injustice resembles injury in 
that both can be viewed as species of harm, however precise-
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we must now deal with is the impact which injustice and in-
jury have on us, and our reactions to them. As we shall see 
presently, the discussion stands to shed further light on (and 
strengthen) the analogy between injustice and injury viewed 
as species of harm. 
b. Pain and Resentment 
The analogy between injury and injustice has a companion 
analogy, one that holds between pain and resentment. As 
before, an analogy between pain and resentment will hold in 
virtue of some features which they have in common, features 
under which they can be subsumed. Before we look for such 
features, we make two brief remarks about how pain and 
resentment are related to injury and injustice, and the con-
sequences which an analogy between pain and resentment 
might have for the analogy between injustice and injury.  
Injury is typically associated with pain in the sense that, 
other things being equal, injury causes us to feel pain. Injus-
tice (being wronged), on the other hand, typically arouses 
feelings of anger and resentment. The association between 
injustice and resentment is not unexceptionable (nor, for 
that matter, is the one between injury and pain), but we can 
in general say that suffering an injustice will be accompanied 
by feelings or resentment, anger, and a desire to retaliate.  
Now for the consequences of establishing an analogy be-
tween pain and resentment: suppose we find a feature which 
pain and resentment have in common. Call this feature “F.” 
Resentment will then be F, and so will pain. But because in-
jury is experienced as painful, and painfulness is a kind of F, 
it follows that injury can also be experienced in terms of F. 
Similarly, because injustice is experienced as something-to-
be-resented, and resentment is a kind of F, it follows that 
injustice, too, can be experienced in terms of F. By simple 
logic, it follows that both injury and injustice will involve ex-
periences of F. Which is to say that injury and injustice will 
have in common, not only being species of harm, as we ex-
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in common. This means that the analogy between injustice 
and injury becomes stronger, with the addition of one more 
feature.  
Let us see then how the analogy between pain and resent-
ment can be developed. (It will become presently clear that 
we have in mind a free-standing analogy, one that makes 
sense apart from any considerations that have to do with in-
justice and injury.) The analogy has two legs to stand on: mo-
tivational role and function in the life of the organism.  
Pain, it is commonly accepted, is a motivating state. This 
means that being in pain moves one to do something in or-
der to make it cease, or to shield oneself from further pain. 
This remains true even when we decide to tolerate pain be-
cause it is necessary for the sake of a greater good, such as 
when one submits to the extraction of a life-threatening for-
eign object from one’s body in the absence of anaesthesia, or 
when the would-be mother tolerates labor pains because it 
means the birth of a child. Of course, pain (as it is universally 
acknowledged), is cognitively mediated, in the sense that it 
can be felt as tolerable or not depending on a variety of cog-
nitive factors (Hardcastle 1997, 381-409; Clark 2006, 177-197; 
Radden 2008). But none of this gainsays the fact that pain, in 
and of itself, is (to use the homely but expressive description 
employed by Pitcher) “awful,” something that we’d rather not 
have (Pitcher 1970, 481-492). Wincing, withdrawal, nursing, 
or just plain help-seeking are all proof of the fact that pain is 
a motivating state. Being in pain puts us in a state of mind 
which is “negative,” or more precisely, aversive—we have a 
“con” attitude towards being in that state, and towards 
whatever we conceive to have been the cause of it.  
What can be said about resentment? I think it can be 
viewed as a natural reaction to perceived injustice, as pain is 
a natural reaction to injury. The correlation between injus-
tice and resentment has instinctive beginnings in our animal 
nature. Perception of danger arouses fear in the case of hu-
mans as well as animals. Similarly, threats to, and violations 
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commonly observe in animals and small children. Long be-
fore children develop a sense of justice and injustice, they 
are able to react with anger, aggravation, as well as aggres-
sion and physical resistance, to actions which violate their 
physical integrity (such as provocation or physical irritation), 
or deprive them of something that they have gotten hold of 
(a toy, or a chocolate bar).7  
In saying that resentment may be viewed as a natural reac-
tion to perceived injustice I do not mean to imply that it is a 
purely natural response, which nurture has nothing to do 
with. A raw emotion such as anger is transformed to indigna-
tion, or moral wrath, once normative considerations of right 
and wrong enter the picture (Zinck 2008, 18). Similarly, one 
may venture to aver that a realization of one’s inability to 
change the situation which gives rise to justified anger can 
subdue the feeling of indignation and turn it into resent-
ment. 
It is true that we do not understand the physical basis 
which underlies our feelings of anger and (much later in our 
lives) resentment, to the degree that we understand the 
physical basis which underlies the feeling of pain. But for 
purposes of developing an analogy between pain and re-
sentment, it is sufficient for us to note that there are regular, 
naturally-cum-socially explainable patterns which relate our 
emotional states to the way we are faring in the world. 
It may thus be plausible to claim that our sense of justice 
and injustice develops from such simple beginnings; that 
emotions which eventually develop into what we call feelings 
of resentment, or indignation are there from the start, in our 
first encounters with situations which we experience as in-
                                                                        
 
 
7 According to empirical research cited in Alexandra Zinck and Al-
ber Newton (2006,17), infants begin to exhibit anger at the early age 
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volving violation, or as being attractive or repellent (John-
ston 2001, 183), comfortable or distressing (Zinck 2008, 11). 
More can be said about resentment, in addition to its being 
a development of natural (emotional) responses to invasions 
and violations. Resentment, of course, is not exactly like 
pain. It does not have the urgency characteristic of pain. But 
like pain, it can be more or less intense, and it is certainly 
cognitively mediated, perhaps to a greater degree than pain 
is. Its intensity corresponds to our perception of the extent of 
injustice, and it can increase or diminish, depending on 
many cognitive factors, such as apology or knowledge of ex-
tenuating circumstances. And, like pain, there are times 
when it is so intense as to be unbearable.  
When we consider resentment in and of itself, however, it is 
not hard to see the motivational aspect which it embodies. It 
is common knowledge that resentment can, and often will, 
lead to doing things—revenge, retaliation, or other types of 
behaviour aiming at modifying the circumstances that led to 
it in the first place. This is not to mention expressions which 
fall short of being actions—expressive actions, so-called, 
such as tone of voice, facial expression, or picture-burning. 
Like pain, resentment is experienced as an unpleasant state, 
one that we would rather be free from. Like pain, resentment 
clamours for changing the world. It is associated with desires 
that have a world-to-mind “direction of fit,” meaning, they 
aim at the changing the world so that it “fits” what we want. 
It can be characterized by the negativity, the very same “con” 
attitude which we find in the case of pain. For these reasons, 
we may conclude that resenting is similar to being in pain: both 
are negative states of mind that motivate us to act. (See Green-
span 1992, [293] on the aversive character of certain emotions). 
This is point at which the present analogy is driving.  
The other leg on which the analogy between pain and re-
sentment stands has to do with the function which both play 
in the life of the organism. Broadly speaking, the function is 
one of protection. Pain is protective in a fairly obvious and 
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harmful, or potentially harmful stimuli, and to seek help 
when the damage is done. Pain is also good at teaching les-
sons of what to avoid, which is why it works so well in the 
form of negative reinforcement.  
Similar things can be attributed to resentment. Injustice, as 
we suggested above, can be viewed as a species of harm. 
Therefore, it makes a lot of sense for a creature to react to 
injustice with an attitude of anger or resentment, because 
this prepares the creature for taking measures in order to 
protect its interests, or whatever it sees as part of its well-
being. As I suggested above, instinctive reactions to “en-
croachments” by outside agents on a creature’s sphere of 
interest include anger, aggravation, and what (in the case of 
humans) later develops into a full-fledged emotion of re-
sentment. And while resentment is not as volatile as anger 
and some other ‘‘hot’’ emotions, there can be no doubt that it 
plays an important protective function is the life of the hu-
man organism that is capable of feeling it.8  
The analogy between pain and resentment can also be seen 
indirectly in cases where there is a marked failure of func-
tion. In the case of pain, many of the fairly well understood 
failures are classified as pathological. The incapacity to feel 
pain the way normal people do is found in such cases as 
asymbolia, congenital pain insensitivity, as well as cases 
where people undergo pre-frontal lobotomy in order to re-
lieve chronic pains. As can be expected, radical failures of the 
pain system lead to shortened life span, due to lack (or 
                                                                        
 
 
8 The “protective” function of resentment is clearly recognized by 
Bishop Butler. In his Sermon “Upon Resentment and Forgiveness of 
Injuries,” Butler says, “The natural object or occasion of settled re-
sentment, then, being injury…, it is easy to see, that to prevent and 
to remedy such injury, and the miseries arising from it, is the end 
for which this passion was implanted in man. It is to be considered 
as a weapon put into our hands by nature, against injury, injustice 
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weakness) of the motivation to withdraw from, or avoid 
harmful stimuli which normal people feel as obnoxious. Far 
from being a curse, pain is in fact a blessing without which 
we would not be able to lead a normal life.9 
We may not be able to say the same thing with the same 
degree of certainty about resentment. The notion of a patho-
logical psychic condition may not sound as scientific as that 
of a pathological physical condition. It is conceivable that 
people who are incapable of resentment are able to lead 
what looks like normal lives. Spock seemed to lead a normal 
life—normal for a Vulcan, at least—most of the time on Star 
Trek, despite reputedly being unable to experience emo-
tions. But the case of a person who is systematically subject-
ed to abuse but nevertheless never shows a sign of anger and 
resentment is not a sight that many of us would like to see. It 
indicates that something had radically gone wrong with the 
individual in question. The individual may not have a short-
ened life span as an individual who suffers from congenital 
pain insensitivity, but there can be no doubt that his or her 
fortunes in the world will decline, that he or she will not fulfil 
whatever potential they might have otherwise had.  
 
 
                                                                        
 
 
9 See the lengthy and touching narrative which Austen Clark quotes 
about Tanya, a child born with congenital pain insensitivity (Clark 
2006, 93): “Tanya, now eleven, was living a pathetic existence in an 
institution. She had lost both legs to amputation: she had refused to 
wear proper shoes and that, coupled with her failure to limp or shift 
weight when standing (because she felt no discomfort), had even-
tually put intolerable pressure on her joints. Tanya had also lost 
most of her fingers. Her elbows were constantly dislocated. She 
suffered the effects of chronic sepsis on her hands and amputation 
stumps. Her tongue was lacerated and badly scarred from her nerv-
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III. Forgiveness and healing 
If injustice is analogous to injury, and resentment is analo-
gous to pain, questions will naturally arise about what hap-
pens after one is injured and experiences pain, and what 
happens after one suffers an injustice and experiences re-
sentment. Are there ways in which such states do, or can, 
come to an end somehow, instead of continuing indefinitely?  
Before we attempt to answer this question, we should note 
that there is a sense in which neither injury nor injustice can 
be undone. There is a certain kind of irreversibility that is 
characteristic of things that happen and become part of his-
tory, an irreversibility which we colloquially describe as “not 
being able to turn back the clock.” This applies to injury and 
injustice in a simple way. Injuries often leave scars. It is also 
often the case that the injured body, or part of it, never goes 
back to what it was before the injury—it aches, or is more 
fragile. Beyond this, injuries leave painful memories, which 
remain alive in the mind for a long time, or are simply never 
forgotten. Similarly, an unjust act may leave a bodily scar, if 
it is literally an act of injuring, but it will anyway register in 
consciousness and memory as a wrongful act which we suf-
fered. Some people may find the notion of “psychological 
scars” too metaphorical, but surely we must be allowed to 
speak of long-lasting psychological effects of many unjust 
acts. Think of the psychological consequences of rape, in-
cest, violent robbery, and betrayal. Such acts are not just 
done and finished, but often leave the victim psychologically 
changed for an indefinite period of time. There will be the 
painful memory, the occasional nightmare, and the uncom-
fortable sense of déjà vu in certain situations, or just the 
sheer inability to function as well as before.  
I do not introduce these similarities between injury and in-
justice in order to add to the analogies which we have al-
ready pointed out. I mention these as part of laying the 
ground for discussing what may be the more important and 
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In the case of injury, this is, as might be expected, none 
other than healing. The body recovers. The pain ceases. One 
is able to walk, to work, or otherwise function as before. In 
some cases as good as before, in some cases not as good. But 
there is no question that in most cases of injury, healing can, 
and does take place. Integrity of the body is restored, and, 
with it, the ability to function more or less normally in rela-
tion to other bodies. 
Forgiveness, too, I want to suggest, may be viewed as a kind 
of healing. There are a number of considerations that suggest 
this. They are related to each other without being equally 
important, or equally telling. I shall begin by discussing the 
most conspicuous consideration, one which is easiest to un-
derstand. It is based on the analogy between pain and re-
sentment. 
Forgiveness, we have been assuming, entails the overcom-
ing of resentment and other retributive emotions, such as 
anger, hate, and the desire for retaliation. Taken in and of 
itself, cessation of resentment is a good thing. For it is well 
known, and stands in no need of argument, that feelings of 
resentment and anger, and the constant nursing of a desire 
to get even, are disordering kinds of emotions (not with-
standing their defensive and protective functions which we 
have sufficiently acknowledged). To harbor them for a long 
time at a certain degree of intensity can damage one’s psy-
chic health as well as one’s physical well-being, not to men-
tion harm relationships to other people, and the prospect for 
happiness after injustice. In a way, such affective states are 
not much healthier than physical pain, which is well-known 
for disrupting one’s whole being, physical as well as psycho-
logical.  
Cessation of pain, in and of itself, is also a good thing, and 
for reasons which we have already considered. But more im-
portantly for the purpose of establishing an analogy between 
forgiveness and healing, cessation of pain is also involved in 
the healing of injuries. Typically, when an injury heals, it 
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an injury heals. Ceasing to hurt is not a sufficient condition 
for healing. But this does not gainsay the fact that, normally, 
an injury that has healed ceases to hurt. Ceasing to hurt is 
part of healing in that we would not consider an injury 
healed (at least on a considered view of what healing is) if the 
subject continues to experience pain in connection with it.  
Because resentment is analogous to pain, it is plausible to 
think that ceasing to resent is like ceasing to hurt. But since 
ceasing to hurt is part of healing, it becomes tempting to 
think that forgiveness is analogous to healing, because it in-
volves the cessation of something which is analogous to 
pain, namely, resentment. 
This does not yet lay a firm foundation for an analogy be-
tween forgiveness and healing, because (it could be said) 
ceasing to resent, or ceasing hurt, may be part of being (or 
becoming) completely oblivious to whatever it is that caused 
one to resent or to hurt. After all, we do not want to say that 
amnesia is analogous to forgiveness, or that general anaes-
thesia is analogous to healing. But this does not undermine 
the proposed analogy. Everything is similar to, and different 
from, an indefinite number of things in an indefinite number 
ways. Before we abandon the analogy, we should see if it can 
be strengthened.  
The very shortcoming we have just alluded to shows us 
what we need to do in order to strengthen the analogy. De-
spite the importance to ceasing to hurt, healing involves 
more than ceasing to hurt, as we shall presently see. For-
giveness follows suit by requiring more than just ceasing to 
resent.  
What does healing involve, in addition to ceasing to hurt? 
The most important thing that healing involves is restoring 
the body to a previous condition of wholeness and integrity. 
The broken bone is re-joined, and resumes its function of 
propping up the body in the usual way; the separated flesh 
closes up, and resumes its function of protecting the organs 
underneath it. True, the restoration may not be complete, for 
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tion as well as before. But for most practical purposes, we 
can say that after healing, the person (the body) goes about 
its business as if there had been no injury. 
Something similar can be said about forgiveness. In fact, 
much of what contemporary writers say about the psycho-
logical significance of wrongdoing and forgiveness fits very 
well with what we have been saying. Consider, first, the kind 
of harm which wrongdoing is. It has been referred to as “in-
jury.” According to Murphy: 
Intentional  wrongdoing insults  us  and at-
tempts (sometimes successfully)  to degrade 
us—and thus it  involves a kind of  injury that 
is  not  merely tangible  and sensible . I t  is  mor-
al  injury, and we care about such injuries . 
(Murphy and Hampton 1988, 25) 
The use of the term ‘injury’ in connection with injustice 
and wrongdoing is well established. We find it in Lucy Allais 
(2008, 41), Murphy and Hampton (1988, 44ff), Jesse 
Couenhoven (2010, 150ff), William Young (1998, 108), Paul 
Newberry (2001, 235), Jerome Neu (2004, 173), and Alice 
Maclachlan (2010, 428), among others, including Butler, of 
course (2006, 93). The choice of words seems natural, not 
because moral injuries cause us to bleed, or because they 
break our bones (though sometimes they do precisely this), 
but because they interfere with normal functioning—they 
render us unable to go about as usual. They cause a kind of 
malfunction, a breakdown, big or small, in the way we deal 
with the world. Therefore calling them injuries, I think, is 
well-justified. It also facilitates drawing an analogy between 
forgiveness and healing.  
Keeping in mind the analogy between injustice and injury, 
and the idea that the healing (of injuries) involves restoration 
to a previous condition of wholeness and integrity, the pro-
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make sense. This is because forgiveness also involves repair-
ing, mending, healing, or, as we shall say here, restoring. 
Some writers speak of “wiping the slate clean,” which, to Al-
lais, is “heart of forgiveness” (Allais 2008, 33). Others speak of 
“re-establishing” the sense of self-worth that one had prior 
to the offence (Verbin 2010, 617). According to Hampton, the 
resenter must conquer, in the sense of “transcend,” the fear 
that that “the insulting message in the harmful action is cor-
rect” (Hampton 1988, 148). All of this can be understood, and 
understood well, in term of the notion of restoration.  
Restoration can take place at either one of two levels, the 
personal or the interpersonal. The first is that of the victim of 
wrongdoing. Writers who view forgiveness as an essentially 
intra-psychic event that need not involve the offender will 
treat forgiveness as something that restores, or (at least) in-
volves restoring the victim’s psyche to a previous condition 
of wholeness and integrity. Something of this kind is hinted 
at in Hampton’s statement that “The first stage of the forgiv-
ing process…involves regaining one’s confidence in one’s 
own worth despite the immoral action challenging it” (Mur-
phy and Hampton 1988, 83; emphasis add). The restorative 
dimension is evident here. The offence undermines our con-
fidence in ourselves, but, as we move towards forgiveness, 
we regain that which we had lost; we are restored to the way 
we were.  
Hampton wonders whether an act of faith in oneself might 
not be needed to accomplish this (1988, 148). Others offer a 
cognitive explanation of how this can happen. Following 
Roberts’s view of emotion as “concernful construal of one’s 
condition” (1995, 303), Verbin claims that the victim has a 
free choice to make between viewing herself in terms of the 
offence (in which case she will see her status as reduced), or 
in terms of her achievements, and how she is valued by peo-
ple aro nd her, etc. If she follows the second path, then she 
might well overcome the resentment, which was set off by 
belief in reduced status in the first place (2010, 608). The vic-
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fence. It is as if she had not been wronged, or morally in-
jured. (The same “as if” notion which we encountered in the 
case of physical healing is equally applicable here.)  
According to Verbin, a victim who ceases to resent thereby 
bestows forgiveness (Ibid., 609). But she can continue to 
think that the offender is a morally rotten person with whom 
she does not want to associate (Ibid., 614). Many philoso-
phers believe this does not qualify as forgiveness, because 
forgiveness involves an attitudinal change towards the of-
fender. It is, I think, plausible to believe that forgiveness does 
involve such a change. For if forgiveness were a purely intra-
psychic event, then there would be no reason why an end of 
resentment that is brought about by any means should not 
count as forgiveness. Verbin’s type of cognitive therapy is not 
necessarily preferable to behaviour modification therapy, or 
the taking of an anti-resentment pill, should one be manu-
factured one day.  
Viewing forgiveness as inter-psychic takes (or at least be-
gins to take) forgiveness beyond the realm of the psychologi-
cal to the social. It allows us as a first step to think in terms of 
the attitude of the victim towards the offender, and then (in-
evitably) how that attitude will be translated in terms of rela-
tions and other modes of behaviour. Here, the phrase ‘wip-
ing the slate clean’ is very much at home. There is a restora-
tion to a previous condition of wholeness and integrity. But it 
is not the psyche of the victim that we are primarily thinking 
of now, but the relation between the victim and the offender.  
A relation between two individuals is in the mind before it 
is in the world. Here, according to Allais, the victim decides 
not to let her feelings towards the offender be affected by the 
wrongdoing. Feeling-wise, she is supposed to feel as if no 
offence had been committed. Viewing the offender in the 
light of how things were before the offence means readiness 
to resume relations. 
A few paragraphs back we said that the restoration which 
forgiveness involves can take place at one of two levels, the 
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cial relations in a general way, but one can also focus on the 
particular relation between the victim and the offender. Both 
aspects are worth considering on their own.  
With reference to social relations in general, it is not far-
fetched to say that every act of wrongdoing constitutes an 
attack on their wholeness and integrity. The social fabric of 
interpersonal relations undergoes damage whenever an act 
of injustice is committed. If it can happen to her, then it can 
happen to you: this is how a wrongdoing appears from the 
perspective of social relations. Conceived in broad terms, 
wrongdoing constitutes an attack on how people relate to 
each other. (It is hard to conceive how human association 
can take place if people are constantly being unjust to one 
another.)  
Viewed from the perspective of social relations, forgiveness 
can be seen as a personal effort at repairing the damage. The 
victim, in wiping the slate clean, signifies her readiness to re-
enter the scene of social interaction with good will, just as if 
she had not been victimized. For example, she will not let the 
wrong stand in way of her trusting people, or entering into 
new relationships. She will not let the memory of the wrong 
color her perceptions of what people are doing. In some cas-
es, it could be hoped that the victim will resume normal rela-
tions with the offender.  
This brings us to the second aspect of interpersonal resto-
ration, where the focus is one particular social relation, the 
one between the victim and the offender. Initially, one might 
think that forgiveness involves no healing as far as the 
wrongdoer is concerned. But this is not true. It is often the 
case that an offender realizes the wrong he has committed. 
He is genuinely repentant. He blames himself. He feels 
guilty. He holds it up against himself that he did this or that. 
So now he needs forgiveness of two parties, it seems: himself 
and the victim. Self-forgiveness (which must be distin-
guished from mere self-indulgence) can be aided by the 
knowledge that one has been forgiven by the victim herself. 
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…a victim’s  forgiveness  of  his  wrongdoer can 
communicate the  same message, so that the 
wrongdoer may reason, “I f  he can see enough 
in me to welcome me back, then maybe I  am 
not such a hideous person after  all . (1988, 87) 
 This makes it possible for the wrongdoer to forgive himself. 
He wipes the slate clean on his own behalf, and is thus re-
stored to a previous condition of wholeness and integrity. In 
a more subtle way, the quality forgiveness may be even more 
blessed than the quality of mercy has been said to be.  
The question or restoring relations between victim and of-
fender in the social setting which was witness to the offence 
compels one to think about conditions that may have to be 
met before this happens. The healing aspect that has to do 
with social relations in general and the relation between vic-
tim and offender in particular, depends not only on the for-
giver, but on the offender as well. The offender may remain 
unrepentant, ever so ready to do wrong again. Or it may be 
that there is no good side to the offender no matter how hard 
we look. In that case I would say that forgiveness can still 
take place, but its healing effect will not extend far beyond 
the forgiver, and the example which he sets for all those who 
care to see. Still, what forgiveness intends, its telos as it were, 
remains unchanged: according to Roberts, it is “reconcilia-
tion—restoration and maintenance of a relationship of ac-
ceptance” (1995, 299). The forgiver is ready to resume rela-
tions with the offender. The damaged social fabric is ready to 
be repaired. But it is not unconditional. The offender has to 
meet certain conditions, which include genuine repentance 
and acknowledgment of responsibility, among other things 
perhaps. 
Consideration of what the offender can do in order to facili-
tate resumption of relations, even the very event of for-
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eration which speaks in favour of an analogy between for-
giveness and healing.  
Injuries, as we know, often require nursing before they 
heal. Broken bones need to be re-aligned, cuts need be 
bandaged, bleeding needs to be stopped, and so on.10 If heal-
ing can be aided by nursing, we can ask if something similar 
applies to forgiveness. Of course, it is possible that sheer 
moral virtue may suffice to bring forgiveness about. In other 
words, it may be possible for a person, out of sheer goodness, 
to forgive a wrong however immense it is. (Perhaps this is 
what Jesus of Nazareth did on the Cross.) But it must be 
acknowledged that more is needed in the case ordinary hu-
man beings who suffer injustice. And indeed we can think of 
many things that facilitate forgiveness, at least in cases 
where the victim’s psyche has not been irreparably damaged 
by the injustice. Here the offender seems to be the star of the 
show. Much depends on the offender. Sincere apology, re-
pentance, restitution, and reparation help bring about for-
giveness. Apology and repentance have special significance. 
In Murphy’s analysis of forgiveness, the repentant and apol-
ogetic wrongdoer takes back the statement, implicit in her 
wrongdoing, that “I am up here, and you are down there.” 
This does not guarantee, but it can help the victim regain lost 
pride, and a sense of importance. It is like nursing a wound 
back to recovery.  
We can also think of other kinds of nursing which the vic-
tim, and others, can engage in. Public affirmations of value, 
moral support, and special treatment, can help the victim 
reach a stage of rising above the offence, and the offender. 
Certain kinds of therapy can also play a role in bringing re-
                                                                        
 
 
10 I do not mean to take this to extremes. It will be acknowledged in 
the last section that healing is basically a natural process. Wounded 
animals often heal without receiving much by way of nursing, un-
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sentment under control, or getting rid of it altogether. A cog-
nitive type of therapy might enable the victim to see the 
wrong doer as a fellow human being who has done wrong; to 
see wrongdoing as an inevitable part of human life, where 
one is cast in the role of wrongdoer as frequently as one is 
cast in the role of victim. One thinks, “there, but for the grace 
of God, go I.” Dwelling on such considerations in a true phil-
osophical spirit may curb one’s enthusiasm to cast the first 
stone.  
IV. Objections and replies 
We have now explored a number of systematic similarities 
between injury, injustice, pain and resentment, leading up to 
the proposal to understand forgiveness in terms of healing. 
The structural similarities observed at the different levels are 
too numerous to be lacking in significance.  
But the objection will inevitably be raised: there are nu-
merous differences between the concepts invoked in our 
discussion which may render the analogies weak. Unlike an 
act of injustice, an injury is something that happens in the 
natural order. It is up to the body, as a system of organic pro-
cesses, how and when an injury heals. Nobody tells blood to 
coagulate, thereby closing a bleeding wound. Nobody tells 
the body to replace burnt-off skin, or to sprout a new finger-
nail in place of one that has been badly damaged. Healing 
processes have a natural, almost mechanical aspect about 
them. What can happen will happen, barring unusual cir-
cumstances, such as when the body is robbed of its ability to 
heal—for example, a wound is so severe that the organism 
bleeds to death. 
 Over and above naturalness of healing, but intimately 
connected to it, is the fact that healing fails to give rise to 
normative questions. It makes little or no sense to ask 
whether it is right for a broken bone to mend or not. But it 
makes a lot of sense to ask if one ought to forgive or not. It 
may be that there are wrongs that are ought not to be forgiv-






sInjustice as Injury, Forgiveness as Healing  85 
 
In these ways, it will be said, forgiveness seems different. It 
is not a physical occurrence or a material process. It is an 
affective/cognitive affair which takes place in the realm of 
meanings, intentions, reasons and feelings. There is no air of 
inevitability about it. One who has been wronged may or 
may not forgive. One contemplates, agonizes, and engages in 
emotional struggle. But forgiveness is not an inevitable re-
sult. It seems be to a voluntary action which one may or may 
not choose to do.  
Nor, it could also be claimed, does the pain-resentment 
analogy fair any better. Pain is a physiological process sub-
served in the Central Nervous System in fairly well-
understood ways, in function as well as malfunction. Re-
sentment, on the other hand is a psychic affair, one that can-
not be understood in physiological terms. It tends to be 
much more cognitively mediated than pain, and it is under 
our control to a much greater degree than pain is. Like for-
giveness, it gives rise to normative questions which pain 
cannot give rise to. The question “is it right for him to con-
tinue to resent?” makes sense, but there is little sense to be 
found in the question “is it right for him to continue to feel a 
toothache?” 
But these considerations need not mean that forgiveness 
cannot be meaningfully compared to healing. To begin with, 
it is not completely true that normative questions are out of 
place in the cases of injury and pain. Turning from question 
of “right” to questions of “good,” one can certainly ask 
“Would it be good for the injury to heal, and for the pain to 
cease?” These are meaningful normative questions which we 
tend to answer in the affirmative, because we consider well-
being to be a human good. Nor is it true that healing is invar-
iably a purely physiological process, at least in the case of 
human beings. In many cases, there is such a thing as having 
or losing the will to live, which can have an impact on heal-
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Besides, all analogies involve similarities and differences. 
One does not make an analogy between two perfectly similar 
things. The real question is whether the similarities are sig-
nificant enough to render the analogy enlightening, and 
whether the differences are relevant in a way that weakens 
the analogy.  
Let us consider what, if anything, the differences prove. Re-
call the similarities between healing and forgiveness: both 
involve cessation of essentially aversive states; both involve 
restoration to a previous condition of wholeness, and normal 
function; and lastly, there is an element of nursing or caring-
for that plays a role in both cases. 
With these similarities in mind, we can ask: what does it 
matter that, in the case of (physical) healing, but not for-
giveness, the healing process can come about naturally—as a 
matter of what the laws of nature dictate? Surely, we can im-
agine that there are two kinds of cases: cases where the resto-
ration is brought about by natural means in the natural 
realm, and cases where restoration is brought about by other 
means—ones that involve moral reasoning, emotional strug-
gle, faith, or whatever. There may also be two ways of caring-
for, or aiding: one involving bandaging wounds, and one in-
volving giving assurance or moral support. And (finally) 
there may be two ways in which aversive states may come to 
an end: one takes a pill, or one comes to realize that one 
should not feeling that way.  
One may continue to insist that the similarity we are trying 
to capture by talking about “aversive states” (for example) is 
superficial. It could be claimed that talk of “two ways” in 
which states could come to an end is uncalled for, because 
there isn’t some one thing that can come to an end in one of 
two ways. This criticism can be extended to the other two 
aspects of the comparison: neither restoration, nor nursing, 
it could be said, is a substantive notion of something that is 
common to such different things as suffering a physical inju-
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Perhaps there is an ultimate clash of intuitions when it 
comes to thinking about the pairs: injustice, injury; pain, re-
sentment; forgiveness, healing. One can be too impressed by 
(or one can be of two minds about) the differences to be 
found between members of each pair. The differences are 
undeniable. But then so are the similarities which, as we saw, 
can be elaborated, rather intuitively and naturally, along 
many dimensions. Add to that the fact that ordinary modes 
of thinking and speech are on the side of the analogies. We 
speak of injuries that are physical, psychological or moral 
(Cf. Murphy and Hampton [1988, 25] and others mentioned 
above). Pain and resentment are uncomfortable, with some 
emotional states being every bit as ‘‘awful’’ as pains. Talk of 
‘‘healing’’ is also not out of place, as when we speak of people 
who have been psychologically traumatized by acts of 
wrongdoing or injustice. 
There is thus no call for us to invent new words so that we 
can call things by different names in the present case. That 
would only make it easy for us to overlook meaningful analo-
gies and similarities between injury, injustice, pain, and re-
sentment. It is enough for us to acknowledge the existence 
and importance of differences while insisting on relevant 
similarities. If we do this, analogy between forgiveness and 
healing will be sustained.  
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